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Remittance flows have become enormously important as a source of income in 
several developing countries. The increase in worldwide migration, together with 
technological advances and competition among financial institutions that lead to a 
reduction in money transfer costs without the need for physical mobility of migrants, 
have contributed to this fact.  Flows of workers’ remittances to developing countries were 
estimated to be $160 billion in 2004, with approximately $40 billion going to Latin 
America, the highest recipient region (Acosta et al., 2006). Moreover, such remittances 
constitute the second most important source of external funding in developing countries, 
following Foreign Direct Investment (Adams and Page, 2005). 
This paper presents evidence on how recipient households in El Salvador decide to 
spend this extra income. Remittances can contribute to reducing liquidity problems that 
are often present in developing countries. In particular, conditional on the same amount 
of non-remittance income, it can be expected that recipient families will expand their 
consumption of leisure and their investment in the human capital of their children. 
Empirical findings on such outcomes would add to our understanding of the costs and 
benefits of this type of aid in dependent economies. If labor supply decreases in recipient 
households, these families may continue to depend on external transfers to meet their 
needs. This strong dependence on foreign aid would not be expected to decline in the 
future. In this regard, Kritz et al. (1981) asks, “Do remittances help the development 
process or, like drug dependency, does their existence primarily feed the need of further 
(more) remittances in the future?”. Remittances can contribute to economic growth,   3
however, if they are channeled into productive investment, such as the acquisition of 
human capital by future generations. 
A methodological concern regarding the impact of remittances on household 
outcomes is that the pool of migrants and remittance senders is not a random sample. As 
pointed out by Hoddinott (1994), migration can be modeled as the outcome of a joint 
utility maximization made by the prospective migrant and other household members. The 
presumption that migrant families are systematically different from non-migrants in 
observable (wealth, education) and non-observable (ability, income shocks) 
characteristics complicates the identification of the effect of remittances using standard 
OLS techniques. In such a context, sample selection as an omitted variable problem may 
be present. As an example, in the case of school attendance, if migration requires 
incurring substantial travel costs, in a context of capital market imperfections, 
presumably only wealthy families can afford both migration and children’s schooling. 
Without proper controls for household wealth, the coefficient for remittances in a school 
attendance equation could be biased. For certain outcomes, selection correction methods 
need to be considered in order to avoid inferring the wrong effects of remittance receipts. 
Even after accounting for sample selection, we must be careful because remittances 
can be correlated with unobserved determinants of the outcome of interest. For instance, 
if remittances constitute the return on an investment, for which the asset is the family 
member residing abroad, the household head’s decision to send a member abroad or 
make that individual work at home would be simultaneously determined. Similarly, 
unobserved (for the econometrician) income shocks can both stimulate higher remittance 
flows and, at the same time, have a direct impact on schooling and working decisions.   4
Indeed, previous studies have stressed the role of remittances as an insurance mechanism 
in volatile environments (Yang and Choi, 2005). One way to address the endogeneity 
problem regarding remittances is to use instrumental variables (IV). 
This paper uses data from household surveys from El Salvador in order to evaluate 
the impacts of transfers from abroad. The results show that remittances have mixed 
effects at destination in terms of investment in human capital. Using migration networks 
at the village level and household migration history as instruments, robust estimates 
suggest that girls (11-17 years old) and young boys (11-14 years old) are more likely to 
stay at school than are those from non-recipient households. The positive effect does not 
appear to apply to the case of older boys (15-17 years old). Remittances are also 
negatively related to child wage labor (working for a wage) and adult female labor 
supply, whereas average adult male labor participation remains unaffected. The last 
gender difference on the impact of remittances on labor supply could be suggesting a gain 
in the relative power of women after migration, especially if they are more likely to be 
the recipient person within the household.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II reviews the literature 
on the uses of remittances. Section III presents the data used in the study. Section IV 
describes the case of El Salvador in terms of migration and remittance behavior. Section 
V presents the main results of the paper. The paper concludes in Section VI, with 
suggestions for future research. 
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II. Uses of Remittances and Previous Literature 
 
The literature on remittances can be divided into two areas: motivation to remit and 
uses of remittances. While the first topic has been extensively studied over the past two 
decades, an increasing number of recent papers have been focused on the uses of 
remittance receipts at the micro level.
1 Due to data limitations (in particular, senders’ 
characteristics), the present paper will not present additional evidence on motivation to 
remit. In contrast, this study will add to the literature on uses of remittances at destination 
by focusing on the impact of remittances on household labor supply and investment in 
children’s education. 
As mentioned above, remittances can boost consumption, increase savings, or 
stimulate investment in economies with liquidity constraints. One of the first studies that 
addressed the economic consequences of remittances at destination is Funkhouser (1992), 
who finds that, in Nicaragua, remittances increase self-employment in men and reduce 
labor supply in women. The increase in self-employment can be interpreted as 
remittances channeled into entrepreneurial investment activities.  
There is a large recent literature on how remittances may affect enterprise 
development. Adams (1998) finds no effect of external remittance receipts on non-farm 
asset accumulation in rural Pakistan. Woodruff and Zenteno (2004) show that, in Mexico, 
investment in small enterprises (mostly self-employment) is higher in states with higher 
migration rates and higher remittance receipts. The authors associate the findings with the 
                                                 
1 For a recent literature survey on motivations to remit, see Docquier and Rapoport (2005). Other papers 
addressing the topic are Lucas and Stark (1985), Funkhouser (1994), Hoddinott (1994), Yang (2004), and 
Halliday (2006). 
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presence of wealth and capital constraints in enterprise development. Yang (2004) shows 
that favorable exchange rate shocks at international migrant destinations lead to greater 
entry into relatively capital-intensive enterprises by migrants’ origin households, 
interpreting the effect as an indication of the higher purchasing power of the amount 
remitted.  
Remittances can not only increase physical investment, they also can expand human 
capital accumulation, such as health or education. This paper draws heavily on Cox-
Edwards and Ureta (2003), who present evidence that remittances reduce school dropout 
hazard rates in El Salvador using the 1997 wave of the household surveys analyzed 
herein. One of the concerns is that the Cox-Edwards and Ureta study does not address 
potential sample selectivity issues and endogeneity of remittances. Therefore, their 
findings could be tested using alternative econometric techniques.  
Indeed, other recent papers employ a reduced-form approach to estimate the effect of 
remittances on children’s schooling and health. Hanson and Woodruff (2003) relate child 
education to having a family member living abroad for the case of Mexico. They find a 
positive relationship between the two variables and argue that the variable that drives this 
result is remittances. They control for potential endogeneity of having a migrant family 
member by using historical state migration rates and household characteristics.  
Yang (2004) also presents evidence of how an appreciation of the currency at the 
origin country increases children’s schooling and lowers children’s labor supply at 
destination (Philippines), once again attributing the causal relationship to the role of 
remittances. Lopez Cordova (2005), in the case of Mexico, provides evidence that 
remittances can increase children’s school attendance, decrease infant mortality, and   7
reduce child illiteracy. These results are robust to IV techniques that use historical 
migration rates and distance to the US border as instruments. Finally, Hildebrandt and 
McKenzie (2005) and McKenzie (2005a) show a positive effect of migration on child 
health (reducing infant mortality and increasing birth weight) in Mexico, also using 




The data used in this paper come from a 1998 cross-sectional household survey, 
“Encuesta de Hogares de Propositos Multiples” (EHPM) in El Salvador.
2 The national 
survey (of urban and rural areas) contains detailed information on demographic 
characteristics (including education and health measures), current and previous 
employment status, earnings, and expenditures (food, health, education, housing), the 
number of family members residing abroad, cash transfers received from abroad 
(remittances), and how this money was spent (food, health, education, housing). The 
survey questions are at the household level, but they include information on every 
member of the household. Each survey contains information on approximately 12,000 
households.
3  
Although repeated cross-sectional household surveys are available for the period 
1992-2000, the data coverage is not homogenous. Only the sub-sample 1998-2000 refers 
                                                 
2 The household surveys are part of the program “Programa para el mejoramiento de las encuestas y la 
medicion de las condiciones de vida en America Latina y el Caribe” (MECOVI), a joint project of the Inter-
American Development Bank (IADB) and the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC, UN). 
3 Cox-Edwards and Ureta (2003) use the 1997 wave of the EHPM in their paper. The OLS results of this 
paper are similar when using 1997 instead of 1998 data.  
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to the same municipal areas (“villages”). The paper uses the 1998 wave because this is 
the only year for which detailed information on household migration (previous migration 
spells and area of birth of actual household members) was asked in the EHPM. Such 
information will be useful in the construction of instrumental variables for the analysis 
that follows. The 1998 wave contains a total of 11,953 households belonging to 111 
“villages” in the country, with all regions nearly equally represented (3,740 households 
from the Metropolitan region, 2,903 from the Western region, 2,780 from the Central 
region, and 2,952 from the Eastern region).  
A panel structure would be ideal to help solve the potential selection problem by 
including households’ fixed effects and, in this way, exploit the variability of remittances 
within a household across time. Unfortunately, this is not possible as each survey does 
not follow the same group of households. The data are also incomplete in that, for the 
sender, only the number of migrant family members is known (the question refers to the 
“number of members from this household living abroad”).  
Concerning remittances, the survey questions include whether the household 
receives transfers from abroad, as well as their amount and the frequency. Information on 
the items (food, housing, health, education, savings) the family decides to spend money 
on, from the amount remitted, is also available. However, as pointed out by Cox-Edwards 
and Ureta (2003), it is easy to doubt the reliability of such information, as people tend to 
pool remittances and earned income when expenditure decisions are made. Recall bias 
also may be an important source of measurement error in such questions.   
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IV. Migration and Remittances in El Salvador 
 
El Salvador has a long history of external migration to neighboring countries and to 
the US. Starting in the 1970s, armed conflicts displaced a great proportion of the 
population to other areas in the country (internal migration) and abroad (external 
migration). Funkhouser (1997) notes that approximately 15% of the population emigrated 
between 1979 and 1989, mostly for political reasons.
4 According to the 2000 US Census, 
817,000 Salvadorans live in the US, with 60% of them entering the country before 1990. 
Official Salvadoran migrants in OECD countries reached 12% of total population by 
2000 (Acosta et al., 2006).  
Early migrants constituted a social network at destination that helped subsequent 
emigration during the 1990s.
5 Even after achieving peace in the 1990s, migration flows 
remained high during the last 15 years. Menjivar (2000) finds evidence of the existence 
of large social networks among Salvadorans in California, with 80% reporting that they 
received help from US relatives and friends for the trip. Additionally, the majority of 
migrants appear to be permanent: household survey data for 1997 show that, among the 
households with a family member abroad, 67% believe that their migrant relatives will 
not come back to live permanently in the home country. 
Table 1 presents evidence of the pattern of external migration by region in El 
Salvador. According to the 1992 Salvadoran Census, 5.9% of the population migrated 
abroad. Column (2) shows the proportion of people living abroad with respect to the total 
                                                 
4 Starting in the late 1970s, El Salvador experienced a civil war that intensified during the 1980s. An 
agreement ending hostilities by all parties was reached in February 1992. See Funkhouser (1997) for a 
description of the conflict period. 
5 See Munshi (2003) and McKenzie (2005a) for the role of social networks in migration dynamics.   10
population in the state of origin (estimates provided by the 1992 Census). Column (3) 
shows the proportion of households with family members residing abroad in the 1998 
household survey. Not only are there differences among regions in the proportion of 
emigrants, but both measures also seem to suggest that there are certain regions that 
systematically send more people abroad. The states of San Miguel, Morazan, and La 
Union, in the Eastern region, have the highest emigration rates.  
Migrant remittance flows have gained importance as a source of income only in the 
last two decades. For instance, official flows represented 0.3% of GDP in 1980, but their 
share increased to 7.4% of GDP by 1990, 12.9% in 1998, and 16.1% in 2003.
6 Official 
data estimate total remittances in 2003 at $2.11 billion in El Salvador.
 7 As a source of 
income in El Salvador, remittances are among the largest of developing countries, only 
below Haiti (41.2% of GDP) and Jamaica (17.7%), among Latin American and 
Caribbean countries, and Tonga (45.3%), Moldova (23.9%), Lesotho (23.8%), Jordan 
(22.3%), and Lebanon (20.2%) in the rest of the world (data for 2003). Indeed, 
Funkhouser (1995) states that labor constitutes the largest export of the country. 
Household survey data used in this paper reflect that nearly 20% of the households in the 
country receive remittances from abroad. 
Remittances flows closely follow external migration patterns. Column (4) in Table 1 
shows the proportion of households that received remittances in 1998.
8 Note that the four 
states that have relatively higher emigration rates (Eastern region) are also the ones that 
                                                 
6 International Monetary Fund (IMF), Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook. 
7 These figures represent lower bounds for the true amount transferred in the form of remittances, as only a 
portion of total income receipts flow through official channels. Unofficial channels (not through courier 
agencies or financial institutions) include various mechanisms of hand-carried cash by migrants during 
visits or upon repatriation by friends. Russell (1986) notes that, in some developing countries such as 
Sudan, only 24% of migrants reported using banks when remitting.   
8 Throughout the analysis, only cash transfers (not in kind) will be considered as remittances.   11
have a higher proportion of remittance recipients. In fact, remittances are substantially 
related to having a family member abroad in 1998 (correlation coefficient of 0.695). It is 
also worthwhile to note that the central and eastern states had the highest level of political 
conflict in the 1980s (Funkhouser, 1997).  
As seen in Table 1, the importance of remittances as a source of household income 
differs geographically. Figure 1 shows the evolution of remittances for 1992-2000 by 
year for each region. Throughout this period, the proportion of recipient households 
increased substantially, from 14% in 1992 to 20% in 2000 (sample data from household 
surveys). The proportion of households that is the recipient of remittances increased in all 
regions. Moreover, the ranking of regions ordered by the importance of remittances is 
virtually the same for all years considered, with the eastern states standing out from the 
rest of the country (with 30% of recipient families in 2000) and the proportion of 
recipients in the central states increasing from 15% to 22% by the end of the decade.  
A plausible explanation for the increase in the number of recipients of remittances is 
the decrease in transfer costs for sending money back home, due to technological 
advances and more competition among financial institutions. Household survey data for 
1997 show that 74% of  households received money transfers through courier agencies 
(i.e., Western Union), 9% through banks and other financial institutions, and only 17% in 
hand through relatives and friends (unofficial channels). 
It would be interesting to characterize household recipient families and compare 
them to non-recipients. Table 2 shows average characteristics categorized by recipient 
status. It is important to note that it is not possible to distinguish between causes or 
consequences of receiving remittances or between remittances and just selection into   12
migration (having a family member abroad). Indeed, some differences can be related to 
the decision to migrate and remit or related to the consequences and uses of remittances.  
The estimated number of adult equivalent members is equal across recipient and 
non-recipient groups (although migrant members are not observed), who have similar per 
capita expenditure levels.
9 However, recipient families appear to be better educated. In 
addition, household heads of recipient families are, on average, seven years older than 
non-recipient heads. Recipient households also have a higher proportion of female heads 
(not married or with husbands not currently present at home) compared to non-recipient 
households. Household heads in remittance recipient families are more likely to be 
employed in agricultural activities. Finally, as expected, a much higher proportion of 
recipient households have family members abroad, although nearly 30% receive 
remittances from outside their circle of close relatives.  
Other differences are associated with life quality; a higher proportion of recipients 
has access to electricity, water, sanitary, and telephone services. Additionally, the number 
of rooms per adult equivalent is larger for recipients, and a greater proportion of them has 
a refrigerator. Regarding the outcome variables of interest in the paper, recipient 
households appear to have fewer children, a higher proportion of children that stays at 
school, and a lower proportion who works for a wage. Finally, concerning labor supply, 
the evidence seems to suggest that both adult men and women in the household are less 
likely to work if they receive remittances. 
                                                 
9 Deaton (1997) suggests computing adult equivalents using the formula AE = (A + αK)
θ, where A 
represents the number of adults, K the number of children (in this case, 0-9 years old), α is the cost of a 
child relative to that of an adult, and θ is a parameter related to the extent of economies of scale. Many 
studies computing adult equivalents assume α = 0.5 and θ = 1. These values are used here.    13
It appears that recipients and non-recipients differ substantially in terms of certain 
demographic and socio-economic characteristics. Some of these differences can be 
attributed to selection into migration and selection into remitting. For instance, a key 
selection dimension that could bias any OLS estimate of the impact of remittances in 
household spending decision is per capita income, expenditure, or wealth. If the evidence 
supports the idea that remittance recipients come from clear segments of the 
income/expenditure/wealth distribution shape in the country, it is then necessary to use 
some sample selection correction technique in order to control for the fact that families 
are not randomly assigned into being a recipient. 
It is also necessary to examine the income, expenditure, or wealth distribution in 
order to identify segment locations for migrant families. An important concern is whether 
to investigate per capita pre-remittance income, non-durable consumption expenditure, or 
household wealth. Deaton (1997) mentions the advantages of using expenditure, as 
opposed to income, for measuring long-run well being, in particular if households can 
smooth consumption and avoid the volatility of current economic conditions. Moreover, 
in the absence of perfect capital markets, as in rural developing areas, expenditure is 
easier to measure because certain market activities are replaced by home production. A 
further problem with the use of non-remittance income, given this particular dataset, is 
that income is not observed for migrants. If migrant’s income is ignored, it is equivalent 
to computing a potential income equal to zero for migrants had they stayed at home, 
which is far from a reasonable assumption. In the event of detailed characteristics of the 
migrant, absent in the data used in the paper, this counterfactual home income could have 
been computed.    14
In contrast, the use of per capita expenditure would require the underlying 
assumption that the migrant in question would have consumed the average current 
household basket had he or she stayed at home, a much less restrictive assumption given 
the above mentioned problems with income. However, expenditure levels are not very 
helpful for looking at selection into remittance recipients, as they are likely to be affected 
by remittances flows. An alternative is to examine ownership status of different 
household assets, whose acquisition is less likely to be affected by current remittance 
flows and more likely to reflect past savings (in particular, in poorly developed credit 
markets such as that in El Salvador). The assets and housing characteristics available in 
the data that could be considered include the following: number of rooms per adult 
equivalent, home ownership and cement floor (housing); water, electrical, sanitary and 
telephone services (access to utilities); and refrigerator, automobile, TV, VCR, and 
sewing and washing machines (durable assets).  
With these asset holdings, the idea is to construct a linear index using a particular set 
of weights. Equal weights are not appealing because equality of importance is an 
arbitrary assumption. In the absence of prices, dates of purchase, or current values for 
these assets, a reasonable assumption is to construct the index using a First Principal 
Component statistical procedure. The underlying assumption is that household long-run 
wealth explains the maximum variance in the asset variables. Filmer and Pritchett (2001) 
show that such index can provide reasonable estimates of wealth effects and long-run   15
economic status in the absence of specific information on wealth levels and weight.
10 The 
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where ajk is the presence of asset k in household j, āk is the sample mean and sk is the 
sample standard deviation for asset k across households, and fk is the weight assigned to 
asset  k. The method assigns the weights so that the index provides the maximum 
discrimination possible between households, with the assets that vary most across 
households getting larger weights. For instance, an asset that all households own will be 
given zero weight because it explains none of the variation across households. See Filmer 
and Pritchett (2001) and McKenzie (2005b) for further details on the application of First 
Principal Component techniques in the construction of asset indexes and their advantage 
in approximating wealth levels. The asset index constructed has a correlation of 0.444 
with per capita non-durable expenditure levels. 
The first panel in Table 3 presents evidence concerning selection into migration and 
remittance receipts—how recipient families vary according to this asset index 
distribution. The pattern suggests that the proportion of recipient families and the 
likelihood of having a migrant family member are much higher for richer and better 
educated families. For instance, 7.9% of the households at the lowest decile receive 
                                                 
10 Recent studies that use First Principal Component based indexes of assets ownership as a control for 
economic status and living standards are McKenzie (2005b) on inequality, Mora and Taylor (2005) on 
migration destination, and Tarozzi (2005) on child nutrition. 
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remittances and 7.2% have a family member abroad, while these figures are 18.7% and 
17%, respectively, for the population. The proportion of migrants and remittance 
recipients increases almost monotonically with asset holdings. Similarly, per capita 
consumption of non-durable goods closely follows the ordinal classification of asset 
holdings. The evidence found can be rationalized by the hypothesis that, if migration 
costs are high for Salvadorans, poor families are more liquidity constrained and unable to 
finance the migration trip.  
 Of course, recipient families could be using money transfers in order to acquire 
some of the household assets used in the index, which then would not properly reflect the 
situation prior to migration. Ideally, we would like to have household wealth prior to 
migration in order to properly assess their economic situation at the time of the migration 
decision. Recognizing that this is an important concern, the presence of a negative 
relationship between household wealth and per capita amount remitted as a share of total 
income (including remittances) in the last column gives more credibility to the positive 
selection pattern suggested. In effect, even though families at the lowest deciles in the 
distribution are less likely to receive remittances, at this level, the contribution of the aid 
is higher compared to average recipient families. Docquier and Rapoport (2005) argue 
that an altruistic motive can rationalize this behavior, as the marginal dollar value of the 
money sent home increases for poor households. Finally, the second panel describes the 
proportion of recipient families in terms of maximum household educational levels. 
Again, a higher proportion of families are remittance recipients among more educated 
households.   17
In other words, Tables 2 and 3 suggest that recipient households are not a random 
group, that is, selection into migration is an important issue to be taken into account. The 
question of whether migrants are truly positive selected cannot be properly addressed 
with the data at hand in the absence of migrants’ characteristics. However, the evidence 
indeed suggests that migrant families are not randomly selected from the pool of non-
migrant counterparts. This means that, for an accurate econometric estimation of the 
impact of remittances on household decisions, it is necessary to control for characteristics 
that influence the decision to remit and migrate. Of course, even after controlling for 
observable dimensions, it is possible that senders and recipients differ in unobservable 
characteristics correlated with the decision to remit. Senders’ income and entrepreneurial 
spirits are, for instance, variables not properly observed in the data that could potentially 




V.a. Decision to Remit and Migrate 
 
Before analyzing the impact of remittances on household leisure and investment in 
the human capital of children, it is worthwhile to examine family characteristics that may 
motivate the decision to remit. As argued earlier, remittances cannot be seen solely as an 
income shock that expands household budget, but rather should be seen as the result of an 
intertemporal common strategy among household members located at different spatial 
points.   18
In the absence of information about the sender, it is difficult to interpret the estimates 
as a test for different motives to remit. For instance, if there is a positive relationship 
between family wealth or expenditure and the decision to remit to that family, it may be 
tempting to conclude that the evidence suggests a self-interest motive (e.g., a bequest). 
However, two important omitted variables that may be correlated with family income are 
sender’s income and sender’s education. Hence, not controlling for these variables can 
result in an upward bias in the coefficient of home income/expenditure. In any case, these 
results should be taken with caution, and they are presented with the sole purpose of 
identifying variables that can explain selection into migration/remittances.   
The likelihood of being a recipient family is represented by a reduced form equation 
influenced by both household level and village level characteristics. As stated earlier, 
sender characteristics are also likely to influence the decision to remit; therefore, several 
crucial variables are omitted, which complicates the causal interpretation of the results. A 
probit specification is used, with the dependent variable taking the value of 1 if the 
household is a recipient and 0 otherwise.  
Table 4 shows the results (marginal effects) for the likelihood of being a recipient 
household. Column (1) controls for geographic (province/state), demographic, and socio-
economic characteristics of the household, including per capita expenditure. Conditional 
on other characteristics of the family, richer households in terms of per capita expenditure 
seem to be more likely to receive remittances. Remittances also seem to go 
predominantly to female (16% higher probability) and married household heads (4% 
higher). This fact seems reasonable if one believes that it is more likely that the family 
member who migrates is the husband. Unfortunately, the data only indicate whether a   19
family member migrates and remits, but not the type of relationship with the home 
family. Families with a higher number of children are also more likely to receive 
remittances. A U-shaped relationship is found between household head’s age and 
remittances (both youngest and oldest heads are more likely to receive remittances). 
Finally, transfers are more common in rural areas, suggesting a potential role of 
remittances as an insurance mechanism in highly volatile environments with incomplete 
credit markets (Yang and Choi, 2005). 
These estimates control for per capita expenditure as a proxy for household wealth. 
However, current per capita expenditure is not likely the best control for wealth, as it is 
likely to be affected by remittance flows. An alternative is once again to examine 
different household assets, whose acquisition is less likely to be caused by current 
remittance flows. In effect, the importance of remittances as a source of income declines 
for higher asset holdings (Table 3). The assets and durable goods considered are the same 
as in Table 3, and the regression includes the First Principal Component index derived 
from them. This method for approximating household wealth in a migration decision 
equation is also used by Mora and Taylor (2005). Controlling for an asset holding index 
in column (2) highly improves the fit of the model. The index proves to be highly 
positively correlated with whether a family receives remittances.  
Column (3) adds controls related to migration at the village level and to the 
migration history of actual household members. The number of return international 
migrants who have spent at least the last two years at home is included. Few households 
have return international migrants (2.7%). Of the cases with return international migrants, 
the household head was one of them in 20% of the cases, in 14% the spouse, in 45% a   20
son or daughter, in 11% a grandson or a granddaughter of the household head, and in the 
remaining 10% other family members living in the household at the time of the survey. 
Similarly, a variable related to the size of the migration network at the village level is 
introduced. The “network” variable is constructed to take into account the proportion of 
families within the village that currently have an international migrant member. This 
way, one can identify whether the household belongs to traditionally sender villages, 
whose social networks abroad can potentially help in the migration process. As seen in 
Table 2, villages in the Central and Eastern regions are traditionally migrant 
communities, compared to the Metropolitan area. 
The additional controls prove to have a significant influence on the likelihood of 
being a recipient family. For instance, village migration networks have a clear positive 
impact on receiving remittances. Similarly, a household is more likely to receive 
remittances if current family members lived abroad in the past (an additional 2.2 
percentage points for each member).  
For comparison purposes, the same analysis was performed for a dependent variable 
related to whether the household has a current family member abroad (column 4). The 
results are remarkably similar to the regressions explaining the likelihood of receiving 
remittances. This should not be a surprise, as both dependent variables are highly 
correlated (0.695). In fact, 78% of the households that have a family member abroad 
receive remittances (although it cannot be determined whether the household actually 
receives remittances from those family members), and 72% of the families that are 
recipients of remittances have a family member abroad.    21
Summing up, Table 4 suggests that the probability of receiving remittances is not 
randomly assigned among households, but depends clearly on a set of observable 
characteristics of the family home. It is also likely that receipt will depend on 
unobservable characteristics of the household that are not captured in these specifications. 
With a panel structure, selection into remittances could be solved by adding households’ 
fixed effects and exploiting the variation in time for within households. Unfortunately, 
data are available only at the cross-sectional level, so there needs to be some control for 
sample selection using alternative techniques.  
 
V.b. The impact of remittances on household behavior 
 
This section presents estimates for the impact of remittances on the spending 
behavior of recipient households as a means to determine whether remittances are 
changing intra-household consumption and investment decision or whether, instead, 
remittances are just associated with unobserved recipients’ characteristics and have no 
causal effect on household budget decisions. The outcomes that will be analyzed are 
related to consumption and investment spending decisions of the families, such as 
investment in the human capital of children or in household (adults) labor supply. The 
fact that 19% of the households receive money transfers from abroad indicates that the 
data contain enough variation to be able to point to the impact of remittances on the 
selected outcome variables. 
In what follows, the variable associated with the impact of remittances is whether the 
family receives transfers from abroad, instead of the amount remitted. The justification is   22
that recall bias may be substantially important for families who decide to pool their 
income, regardless of the source. Families are presumably more likely to remember 
whether they received financial aid from abroad, or from other sources, but not the exact 
amount. As another source of income, remittances traditionally tend to be underreported 
in household survey data when compared to macroeconomic balance of payments figures 
(Freund and Spatafora, 2005; Acosta et al., 2006). For instance, in the 1998 nationally 
representative household survey used here, the calculated remittances over non-
remittance income ratio is 5.9%, much lower than the 12.9% of remittances over GDP 
ratio reported in the IMF’s Balance of Payment Statistics. Measurement error in the 
reported amount received in remittance would introduce a downward bias in the 
coefficient of the impact of remittances on children’s and parent’s outcomes. Therefore, 
even though the present survey asks the total amount received within the year and its 
uses, it is preferred not to use this amount in the regression analysis. 
The equation of interest is a “treatment effect” of remittances on several outcomes. 
For instance, let a latent outcome Yij* representing the acquisition of a particular good for 
individual i in household j (i.e., child enrolled at school) be modeled as a linear reduced 
form spending decision: 
 
'' ' * ij ij j j ij YXWR α βγ μ = ++ +                                      (2) 
 
where Yij* is related to a set of demographic characteristics (Xij) for individual i in 
household j, a set of household characteristics (Wj), the variable of interest related to 
remittance receipts (Rj), and a term associated with unobserved heterogeneity for the   23
individual (μij). The decision function is unobservable, although the dichotomous variable 
Yij (Yij = 1 if Yij* > 0, and Yij = 0 otherwise) is not. I estimate a probit model, where 
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As mentioned earlier, two fundamental problems arise when trying to evaluate the 
impact of remittances on a particular household spending outcome. First, remittance 
receipts may not constitute an exogenous shock. For example, imagine that Rj depends on 
a set of household characteristics Zj (that may include some of the characteristics in Wj 
but it is not a subset of Wj). In other words, 
 
1 ij R =  if 
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where ρ = corr(μij, εj). If the last term is not zero, failure to control for it could 
generate biased estimates of β. The evidence appears to suggest that there could be such a 
selection problem. In fact, several observable characteristics (Table 4) matter in 
determining which households receive these money transfers from abroad, as 
documented in the previous subsection.    24
The second potential problem is that remittances may be correlated with unobserved 
determinants of household outcomes, i.e., Rj correlated with μij. For instance, if school 
attendance responds to unobserved shocks to household income, and if remittances flow 
in part to compensate this variability in income, remittances would be correlated with the 
error term in a school attendance equation. Therefore, using appropriate instruments for 
implementing an IV strategy will better reveal the true impact of remittances flows. 
 
V.c. Remittances and Children’s School Attendance 
 
Table 5 presents estimates for the impact of remittances on school attendance. The 
dependent variable is whether a school-age child is currently enrolled in school. The 
children analyzed are between 11 and 17 years old because outside opportunities such as 
working are available for this group. In addition to remittances, the set of controls include 
household demographic and socio-economic characteristics, geographic location of the 
household, child age and gender, number of children and adults in the household, and 
whether the child in question is the oldest child in the household.  
The first column of Table 5 only considers the impact of remittances on school 
attendance, while the second and third add controls for child and household 
characteristics. Huber-White standard errors are reported to account for 
heteroskedasticity. The result of interest in column (1) shows that remittances increase 
the likelihood of staying in school for the children of recipient households. This result is 
in line with the Cox-Edwards and Ureta (2003) finding of a positive impact of receiving 
remittances on school attendance. Other studies that find similar results are Funkhouser   25
(1992), Hanson and Woodruff (2003), Yang (2004), and Lopez Cordova (2005). The 
marginal effect of receiving remittances suggests that recipient households are 7.1% more 
likely than non-recipients to keep children at school.  
Column (2) adds children and family characteristics. The positive effect of 
remittances remains, although the point estimate is much lower (4.6%) than in column 
(1), indicating that part of the positive impact was only capturing other effects related to 
both schooling and remittances, such as household education. Indeed, conditional on the 
age and gender of the children, better educated families (in terms of maximum household 
education) are more able to invest in the human capital of children. Children from 
households with middle age and married heads are also more likely to stay at school.  
In contrast, there are no significant advantages for children from female household 
heads. Similarly, families in rural areas have fewer children studying, possibly capturing 
an effect associated with distance to school. Children also appear to differ in their 
chances of attending school according to the number of siblings they have. If they have 
young brothers and sisters (0-5 years old), they are less likely to attend school, 
presumably because they have to help in their care. In contrast, if they have more siblings 
of school age, they are more likely to go to school, perhaps reflecting the existence of 
economies of scale in sending children to school.  
However, one important missing control is household wealth. Wealth is most likely 
positively correlated with both schooling and remittances, in particular if, as suggested in 
Table 3 and 4, migrant members come from relatively richer families. If so, a portion of 
the explanation of the positive impact of being a recipient on school enrollment could be 
attributed to higher wealth levels. In effect, the estimated effect of remittances (γ*) would   26
be given by γ* = γ + β*Cov(Rj,μj), where γ is the true impact of remittances, β is the 
effect of household wealth (μj) on schooling, and Cov(Rj,μj) is the covariance between 
remittances and wealth. If the impact of wealth on schooling is positive, and the 
relationship between wealth and remittances is also positive, the estimated effect of 
remittances on schooling would be upwardly biased.  
To investigate whether the estimated effect of remittances is capturing wealth 
effects, column (3) starts by including the first principal component household assets 
index as a control. The assets considered in the index are the same durable goods 
considered in Table 4: rooms per person; home ownership; cement floor; access to water, 
electricity, sanitation, and telephone services; automobile, TV, VCR, refrigerator, and 
sewing and washing machines. As expected, “wealthier” families are more likely to have 
children enrolled in school. The impact of remittances is attenuated (from 4.6% to 1.8%) 
once families are distinguished according to their asset holdings level, reduced to less 
than one half, compared to column (2). Moreover, the remittance effect is no longer 
statistically significant. 
In essence, this implies that estimates that fail to properly control for wealth may be 
biased, similar to an omitted variable problem, as shown in equation (5). After controlling 
for a wealth indicator, the true direct impact of remittances on investment in the human 
capital of children is much lower and no longer significant. It is worth mentioning that 
the drop in the size of the coefficient is not likely to be due to the presence of 
multicollinearity (different proxies measuring the same phenomenon), as the correlation 
coefficient between household wealth index and remittances’ indicator is low (0.133).    27
A recent paper by Lubotsky and Wittenberg (2005) suggests using of the full set of 
proxy variables instead of the more common practice of creating a summary measure 
(index) when controlling for an unobserved explanatory variable. They suggest that the 
First Principal Component procedure may confound differences in wealth with 
differences in tastes. Therefore, column (4) of Table 5 performs the same analysis, but 
this time including the full set of household assets holdings, as opposed to an integrating 
index. None of these asset holding indicators are strongly related to the remittances 
indicator (maximum correlation coefficient is 0.148, for presence of a refrigerator); 
therefore, potential multicollinearity with the variable associated with remittances should 
be less of a concern. This time, the size of the remittance coefficient is further reduced to 
1.1% and once again is statistically insignificant. 
In other words, after correcting for selection in terms of household wealth, the results 
show that school enrollment rates do not significantly improve with remittances. 
However, selection can be present in other dimensions aside from household wealth. For 
instance, sender’s income is not observed in the dataset, but clearly influences the 
decision to remit. At the same time, it can be positively correlated with unobserved 
determinants of children’s school attendance (i.e., through children’s ability). Equation 
(5) shows that a positive correlation among the error terms would generate an upward 
bias in the estimation of the remittances coefficient. 
Several ways to correct for this sample selection problem are possible. One 
alternative is to perform propensity score matching (PSM), as defined by Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1983). The idea is to find children from recipient and non-recipient households 
with similar propensity scores and non-parametrically estimate the effect of remittances   28
on school attendance.
11 Treated and untreated observations are compared after matching, 
based on the probability of being treated. Provided that selection comes from observable 
characteristics, this method consistently estimates treatment effects in a non-experimental 
context. An interesting feature of PSM is that it does not require separability of outcome 
or choice equations, exogeneity of conditioning variables, exclusion restrictions, or 
adoption of specific functional forms of outcome equations (Heckman, Ichimura and 
Todd, 1997).  
The PSM method has a conditional independence assumption: given a set of 
observed characteristics Zij, the counterfactual distribution of the outcome Yij  for 
recipients of remittances is the same as the observed distribution of Yij for non-recipients. 
One of the problems with this method is the presence of selection on unobservables; 
matching models assumes that, conditional on Zij, there is no unobserved heterogeneity 
left that affects both the likelihood of being a recipient and the outcome variable. 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) labeled this assumption as “ignorable treatment 
assignment” (ITA): 
 
 ( ) ( ) 01 ,| | , YY D XW ⊥                                                   (6) 
 
This equation states that conditional on a set of observable characteristics X and W, 
the treatment outcome is independent of the actual treatment status (D, receiving 
                                                 
11 See Ham, Li and Reagan (2004) for an application of propensity score matching methods to the effect of 
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remittances). Because the goal is to estimate the average treatment effect on the treated, 
condition (6) can be weakened to a mean independence assumption involving only Y0: 
 
( ) ( ) 00 || , , || , E YX W D E YX W =                                      (7) 
 
Matching on all the variables in X and W is impractical when the number of variables 
is sufficiently high, as in this case whereby controls at the child and household level are 
available. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) propose to match an index function P(X, W), i.e., 
the propensity score (probability of receiving remittances conditional on child and 
household characteristics), where: 
 
( ) ( ) 0, P r 1 | | , 1 PXW D XW < == <                                      (8) 
 
The condition that the propensity is bounded between 0 an 1 holds whenever the 
mean treatment parameters are defined for all values of X and W (i.e., for each X and W, it 
is possible to observe in the data cases of both Y1 and Y0). It can be shown that, if the ITA 
assumption holds given X and W, it also holds conditional on P(X, W). Among the 
different matching methods, one-to-one matching with replacement (“single nearest-
neighbor”) is chosen. This matching method is particularly recommended when the non-
treated observations are far more common than the treated, as in this case. The method 
operates in the following way:  
a) If several non-recipient individuals matched a given recipient, then one is chosen 
randomly;    30
b) In comparison, if a given non-recipient individual is the best match for more than 
one recipient, it is used in all cases;  
c) If a non-recipient individual is not a best match for any recipient, that individual is 
dropped from the analysis (lack of common support).
12  
For the propensity score calculation, all covariates used in the schooling equation 
(Table 5, column 3) were included. The method requires testing for the “balancing 
condition” of the conditioning variables: differences among treated and control groups 
should be reduced at maximum after matching on observable characteristics. As 
suggested by Imai and Van Dyk (2004), the balancing condition can be tested by 
regressing each variable on the propensity score and on the treatment (recipient of 
remittances). If the coefficient on the treatment variable is not statistically significant, the 
covariate is balanced. All conditioning variables were found to be balanced. 
The semi-parametric estimate for the matched sample for the effect of receiving 
remittances on school attendance is reported in Table 5, column (5). The estimate 
represents the difference in the outcome of interest when comparing a recipient with a 
non-recipient child with similar observable characteristics. The effect of remittances in 
the matched sample indicates that the likelihood that a recipient child attends school is 
1.8 percentage points higher than a non-recipient counterpart and that the difference is 
not statistically significant (standard error of the difference calculated by bootstrap 
                                                 
12 This method is called matching with replacement, and according to Michalopoulos et al. (2003), it results 
in less precision than matching without replacement because of the reduced sample size produced by using 
some non-recipient children more than once. The gain of doing so, however, is a better potential match and 
thus less bias. In this case, the difference between the two approaches is small.  
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techniques with 500 replications). The point estimate is much lower compared to the 7.1 
percentage points in the unmatched sample in column (1).   
However, as stated above, propensity score matching methods only tackle the 
problem of selection of remittances according to observable characteristics. They rely on 
the ITA assumption (equation 6), and assume away selection on the basis of unobservable 
differences. Other less restrictive alternatives could be explored in order to confirm the 
previous result. Recall that the potential sample selection bias concern arises primarily 
because one may think that families with migrant members are systematically different 
from non-migrant counterparts. This presumption can be of help if one thinks that the 
selection mechanism comes from the decision to migrate. Table 4 shows that the 
observed variables that influence whether to have a family member abroad are equally 
likely to matter in a decision to remit. Similarly, one can assume that both decisions are 
also related to the same unobserved determinants.  
If this seems reasonable, a way to get rid of the selection problem is to only examine 
households who have a family member abroad and exploit the fact that 22% of them do 
not receive remittances. Column (6) replicates column (4), but this time, restricting the 
observations to children from households with one or more family members abroad. Most 
of the results remain, including the coefficient for remittances that is still insignificant. 
This is not simply the result of a merely increase in the standard errors due to a reduction 
of the sample size; the point estimate also decreases to 0.9%.  
The other candidate problem, besides selection, is that current remittance receipts 
could be positively related to contemporaneous unobserved determinants of staying at 
school. For instance, a potential link is through income shocks. Negative income shocks   32
(e.g., agricultural shortages) could prevent children from attending school and, at the 
same time, induce transfers from abroad to partially mitigate the shortfall. If so, 
remittances could be correlated with variables that have a negative impact on children’s 
school enrollment, resulting in a downward bias for the estimated coefficient. 
Instrumental Variable (IV) techniques can overcome both this potential endogeneity 
problem and the selection bias noted above. IV requires a set of instruments correlated 
with the likelihood of being a recipient household, but uncorrelated with children’s 
school attendance. The instruments proposed are the village migrant networks and the 
number of international migrants who returned two or more years ago.  
In effect, friends, family members, and social networks abroad may explain why a 
person who lived in another country, but who has returned to the family home, may 
receive remittances. In contrast to “having a current family member abroad,” this variable 
is presumably less controversial as an instrument for remittances, as an ongoing migrant 
family member may be part of a current strategy of the household for diversifying income 
shocks. Of course, the concern is whether there are still family members left behind in the 
foreign country. This does not seem to be the general case; only 29% of the families with 
a person who lived abroad in the past (and has returned) presently has family members 
living abroad. A similar variable for approximating household-level network in a 
migration decision equation is used by Mora and Taylor (2005). 
The second instrument is the migration propensity of the county/village of residence, 
i.e., the proportion of households that currently has a family member abroad in the area of 
reference. Certain states are traditionally migrant senders, as seen in Table 1, and those 
regions probably are more accustomed to being recipients of remittances for reasons   33
other than an income diversification strategy. For instance, states with more migrants 
abroad (San Miguel, Morazan, and La Union) were the states with more political 
conflicts in the 1970s and 1980s. Migration for political reasons, in most of the cases, is 
not chosen by the family; hence, it may be expected that the underlying factors that 
motivate migration in the area of question may be different from those seen in more 
developed and less conflict-affected regions. At the same time, there seems to be no 
direct relationship between village migration rates and schooling, with low correlations 
between migration rates and village-level per capita income, distance to school, or school 
enrollment rates for 6- to 17-year old children (-0.112, -0.007, and 0.064 respectively). 
Historical migration rates by state have been used as instruments for remittance receipts 
by Hanson and Woodruff (2003), Woodruff and Zenteno (2004), Hildebrandt and 
McKenzie (2005), Lopez Cordova (2005), and McKenzie (2005 a).
13 
As pointed out by Newey (1987), the use of 2SLS in a context of a binary outcome 
(schooling) and a binary endogenous variable can result in inconsistent estimates. 
Although Angrist (1991) provides certain conditions under which 2SLS can perform well 
with binary endogenous variables, they are difficult to hold all in practice. Newey (1987) 
suggests the use of Amemiya’s Generalized Least Squares estimator, also known in 
statistical packages as “IV Probit.” 
Amemiya’s GLS estimates using the above-described instruments are presented in 
column (7). Although not reported, estimates of the impact of remittances using 2SLS 
yield similar results. First stage results closely resemble column (3) in Table 4, with a 
                                                 
13 Alternative instruments considered are village-level migration rates interacted with household head 
characteristics (age, education, and marital status), as in Hanson and Woodruff (2003). The results using 
these instruments are qualitatively similar to those reported. 
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strong predictable power of both village and household level networks on the likelihood 
of receiving remittances. Both instruments are individually significant at the 1% level in 
the first stage regression. Sargan’s test for over-identification of the instruments (for the 
2SLS version) does not reject the null hypothesis that both instruments are exogenous to 
the main equation (p value = 0.930). The coefficient of interest, i.e., the impact of 
remittances on school attendance, is higher compared to OLS results in column (4), 3.5%, 
although it is still statistically insignificant.  
OLS estimates that do not properly control for household wealth have suggested that 
transfers from abroad help to substantially reduce dropout rates; however, the claim is not 
entirely valid after accounting for wealth. Even after considering several alternatives that 
take into account potential sample selection on observable and unobservable 
characteristics, as well as endogeneity of remittance receipts, the evidence suggests that 
remittances do not seem to significantly enhance investment in the human capital of 
children, at least for the average child. Section IV.f presents results for different 
demographic groups, discriminating by age and gender, to see whether this claim is valid 
across all children. 
 
V.d. Remittances and Child Labor Supply 
 
In many developing countries, children work instead of, or at the same time as, 
attending school. Typical work activities include family businesses and other informal 
part-time jobs. These activities, while beneficial in the short run for families in order to 
obtain higher income streams, certainly disrupt the acquisition of human capital for future   35
generations. It would be interesting to see whether remittances can help shield children 
from working. Table 6 presents probit specifications for the likelihood of working for 
children between 11 and 17 years old. The dependent variable is whether the child works 
for a wage. Once again, columns (1) to (3) present OLS estimates, and the main result is 
that remittances indeed keep children out of work.  
Column (1) indicates that children from recipient families have 2.8 percentage points 
less chance of working. The impact is lower in absolute value once children and family 
controls are included. Columns (2) and (3) control for household wealth, first using the 
principal component household asset index and then by incorporating the full set of asset 
holdings in order to prevent spurious estimates of the true direct impact of remittances. 
Contrary to the schooling case, household wealth could be positively related to 
remittance receipts, but this time negatively related to child labor. Failure to properly 
control for wealth can assign a weight to remittances that could just be reflecting 
selection in terms of parents’ income generation. Indeed, the point estimates reduce to     
-1.3% and -1.2% respectively, although they remain significant, suggesting a “per se” 
reduction in child wage labor rates for recipient families.  
Other findings indicate that older children and boys are more likely to work. 
Similarly, children from richer (in terms of asset holdings), better educated households, 
from male, married, and medium-aged heads, and with a higher number of adult males in 
the household are less likely to work. In comparison, children from rural regions are less 
likely to be involved in remunerated labor activities (presumably reflecting a lack of off-
farm labor opportunities).     36
Robustness checks for the true effect of remittances start in column (4). Propensity 
score matching methods are first considered. Once again, the idea is to find children from 
recipient and non-recipient households with similar propensity scores and non-
parametrically estimate the effect of remittances on child labor. In this case, the point 
estimate is still large (-1.3%), although not significant. Selection also could be present for 
unobservable characteristics. To capture all selectivity coming through migration, column 
(5) restricts the analysis to the case of children belonging to families with members 
abroad. The main result remains, with remittance effects still negative and significant. In 
other words, no evidence on selection other than household wealth is found, similar to the 
case of children’s schooling.  
Finally, column (6) explores endogeneity issues using village and family networks as 
an instrument for access to remittances. The IV Probit estimate (Amemiya’s GLS) for 
remittances is large (-6.7%) and statistically significant (over-identification tests do not 
reject exogeneity of the instruments with a p value of 0.121). In other words, remittances 
significantly contribute to preventing the average child from working. Apparently, 
remittances substitute for child labor in the household budget.  
 
V.e. Remittances and Adult Labor Supply 
 
It is commonly argued by detractors of unconditioned cash transfers to less 
developed countries that they may have the perverse effect of providing a disincentive to 
labor supply. In fact, if leisure is a normal good, it is expected that an exogenous increase 
in income will increase the consumption of leisure. However, from a development   37
perspective, a fall in labor supply in recipient families should not necessarily be viewed 
as a negative side effect of remittances. For instance, women from remittance-recipient 
households may now afford parenting and home production activities. Recipient 
households could even be spending the extra income on hiring outside labor (therefore, 
creating a positive externality of remittances in neighbor families) or they could just be 
substituting labor by capital or increments in productivity levels.   
Tables 7 and 8 present evidence of the effect of remittances on the adult (between 22 
and 65 years old) labor supply, for males and females respectively. OLS estimates 
suggest a negative impact of remittances on labor supply; men and women in recipient 
households tend to remain outside the labor market.  Marginal disincentive effects are 
virtually the same for males (-6.6%) and females (-6.7%) in column (1). This negative 
impact is robust to the inclusion of certain individual and household characteristics, such 
as a household head indicator, age, education, marital status, household education, 
number of children, number of adults, and area of residence, as well as a control for 
household assets in column (2). Similarly, for women, controls for pregnancy and for 
mothers of young children (0-2 years old) are included.  
Other interesting results are that being a household head increases the likelihood of 
working for men and women. The number of children uniformly increases the probability 
of working for men, but this is not true for women.  For women, pregnancy and having 
young children (0-2 years old) significantly decreases the chances of labor market 
participation. Similarly, the presence of adult males decreases female labor force 
participation, but the availability of other adult women in the household increases it. 
Middle aged adults are more likely to work. Similarly, education increases labor market   38
participation in both males and females. Concerning differences by gender, urbanization 
increases participation only for females, and married women are less likely to remain in 
the labor market, as opposed to males (for whom marriage increases participation). 
Sample selection can be present if families decide to reallocate the labor activities of 
their members in different countries. In that sense, it could be expected that some families 
strategically send family members to work abroad, instead of in the domestic labor 
market. If so, remittance recipients could be systematically different than non-recipients 
in their decision to participate in the labor market. Once again, several sample selection 
corrections can be explored to determine the robustness of these results.  
Results seem to change after selection correction on observables (propensity score 
matching samples, column 3). Propensity score matching indicates that “treated” females 
tend to work substantially less than their “untreated” counterparts, other observable 
characteristics equal.  In the case of males, the negative impact of remittances on labor 
supply disappears; “treated” males do not work less than “untreated” individuals.  
Indeed, further exploration indicates that the robustness of the results led to different 
conclusions for males and females. The analysis restricted to families with members 
currently residing abroad also yields different result in terms of the negative and 
significant impact of receiving remittances on male and female labor supply. Once again, 
while recipient females still tend to work less, this is not true for males. Once selection 
into migration is taken into account, “treated” males, in terms of remittances, do not 
differ from “untreated,” in terms of labor market participation. 
Finally, column (5) presents IV results in order to correct for potential endogeneity 
of remittances, as well as sample selection. The same instruments as those used for   39
children’s school attendance and child labor were considered. In the case of males (Table 
7), the IV approach confirms the results found for the migrant household sample, that is, 
remittances have no significant impact on labor supply. Moreover, the sign is even 
positive in this specification. However, this is not true for females, for whom IV 
estimates suggest that remittances still have a negative and significant impact by reducing 
female labor supply. Even the size of the coefficient is substantially large for females, 
indicating that OLS estimates are upwardly biased in this case. Perhaps women with 
higher entrepreneurial and work spirit ask for remittances in order to start a new business 
or a self-employment activity, and the OLS coefficient for remittances is capturing this 
unobserved propensity to work. The results for males are consistent with Yang’s (2004) 
findings for the Philippines, although he also finds an insignificant impact on the female 
labor supply. 
The differential impact of remittances on labor supply by gender could be indicating 
a gain in the intra-household relative power of women after migration, especially if they 
are more likely to be the recipient person in the household. Unfortunately, the data do not 
indicate which person in the household is the recipient, but the fact that a higher 
proportion of recipient families is female-headed (Table 4) is consistent with this 
assumption. 
 
V.f. Differences by Demographic Groups 
 
The above average results for the impact of remittances on schooling and labor do 
not discriminate by demographic groups. It could be the case that remittances help girls   40
to stay in school and avoid working, but the same may not be true for boys. Or remittance 
can allow children to finish primary education, but not secondary school. Similarly, in the 
case of adults, remittances can allow middle aged individuals to be engaged in 
entrepreneurial activities (i.e., self-employment), the elderly to retire earlier, and younger 
women to consider maternity options as opposed to work. In any case, remittances can 
have different impacts, depending on the demographic group. 
  Table 9 presents Amemiya’s GLS estimates (“IV Probit”) for the interaction 
between remittances and gender, as well as different age groups. For each case, the set of 
instruments included village networks as interacting with the demographic group of 
interest, as well as a family level instrument (number of migrants who returned home two 
or more years ago). In the case of children, the evidence suggests that girls indeed benefit 
from remittances in terms of school enrollment, while boys remain unaffected. 
Remittances seem to be channeled in part into female human capital accumulation. In 
contrast, there is no gender difference in terms of wage labor; both boys are girls from 
recipient households are less equally likely to work for a wage.  
In the case of age groups, 11- to 14-year old children from recipient households are 
more likely to be enrolled in school, compared to non-recipient counterparts, although 
there is no significant impact for older children (15-17 years old). In other words, 
remittances seem to help children to finish primary education, although this does not 
seem to be true for secondary school. In the case of child labor, there is no difference by 
age group for the impact of remittances; children from all ages in recipient families are 
less likely to work.   41
Remittances also appear to differentially affect the adult labor supply. In the case of 
middle-aged (26-59 years old) males, remittance receipts seem to be positive associated 
with labor force participation. Presumably, remittances are helping self-employment and 
therefore generating new labor opportunities for males in the typical work ages. In 
contrast, remittances are not associated with labor participation for younger adults (22-25 
years old) or males in the retirement ages (60-65 years old). In contrast, in the case of 
women, remittances reduce labor for participation at all ages, with a higher negative 
impact at younger ages (presumably allowing maternity options or home-based 
activities).  
The results indicating that the additional income derived from migration increases 
girls’ education and reduces women’s labor supply, with no major impact on activity 
choice for males 14 years or older, suggest the presence of gender differences in the use 
of remittances across households. Unfortunately, the data do not allow testing for intra-
household gender differences in the use of remittances. All that can be said is that, across 




Remittances can affect household labor supply and investment in the human capital 
of children, key outcomes for the promotion of growth in a developing country. The 
paper finds that robust estimates that take into account both selection and endogeneity 
problems in estimating the average impact of remittances are substantially different from 
estimates presented in previous studies.    42
Previous results (i.e., Cox-Edwards and Ureta, 2003) suggest a significant impact of 
remittances on children’s school attendance across all ages and gender. However, 
methodological problems arise when researchers do not consider the potential sample 
selection and endogeneity of remittance receipts. Moreover, when distinguishing by 
demographic subgroups, the evidence in the present study suggests that, while girls and 
young boys (11-14 years old) seem to benefit from remittances in terms of higher 
enrollment rates, the positive impact does not apply to older (15-17 years old) boys.  A 
further positive side of remittances is that these transfers seem to be used as a substitute 
for child labor (outside family businesses or farms), a practice usually associated with 
higher school dropout rates.  
Concerning the adult labor supply, the theory implies that income effects will 
increase consumption of leisure in these foreign-income dependent economies. This 
presumption is corroborated in this paper, at least for females. The fall in labor supply for 
recipient adult females also could be associated with higher rates of parental and home 
production activities. Robust results (after accounting for sample selection and 
endogeneity of remittances) show that, indeed, female labor supply is lower for recipients 
of remittances. However, this is not true for males; the negative OLS impact disappears 
in matched samples, when the analysis is restricted to migrant households and when IV 
techniques are considered. Moreover, the relationship between remittance transfers and 
labor force participation seems to be positive for middle aged males, suggesting that 
remittances could be creating opportunities for self-employment.   
Further research is needed, in particular due to data limitations on sender 
characteristics. Panel data also would allow the inclusion of households’ fixed effects and   43
exploit the variability across time in remittance receipts for a given household. Moreover, 
other development impacts of remittances could be analyzed so as to clarify the long-
term consequences for an economy that relies heavily on income transfers from abroad.    44
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Figure 1: Evolution of Remittances Recipients by Region  49
Table 1 – El Salvador: Measures of External Migration       




2  Region Department 
Population 
Census 1992     





San Salvador  Metropolitan 
La Libertad 
2,024,991 0.059 0.141 0.136 
Sonsonate 
Ahuachapan  Western 
Santa Ana 













1,129,484 0.079 0.229 0.261 
El Salvador  5,118,599  0.059  0.173  0.188 
Data Sources: 1992 Population Census (Columns 1 and 2), EHPM (Columns 3 and 4). 
Notes: 
1 Previous residence in the state of reference and living abroad in 1992 as a percentage of people living in the state in 1992. 
                  2 Percentage of HHs with a family member abroad. 
                  3 Percentage of HHs that receive remittances from abroad. 
 
 
   50
Table 2: El Salvador: Descriptive Statistics – Household Level 
        
Remittances 
 Variables 
Non Recipients  Recipients 
Households  9,704 2,249 
    
Members (Adult Equivalents)
1  4.123 4.169 
  (0.021) (0.045) 
Female Head  0.228***  0.426*** 
  (0.004) (0.010) 
Age of Household Head (Years)  45.356*** 52.297*** 
  (0.158) (0.356) 
Max. Household Education (Years)  7.898*** 8.225*** 
  (0.047) (0.096) 
Number of Children (17 or less years old)  2.139** 2.042** 
  (0.019) (0.039) 
Children at School (11-17 years old)  0.723***  0.794*** 
  (0.005) (0.009) 
Children Working for Wage (11-17 years old)  0.089*** 0.062*** 
  (0.003) (0.005) 
Head Employed in Agriculture
  0.309*** 0.352*** 
  (0.005) (0.013) 
Adult (22-65 years old) Males in Labor Force  0.911***  0.845*** 
  (0.003) (0.009) 
Adult (22-65 years old) Females in Labor Force  0.519***  0.452*** 
  (0.005) (0.010) 
Rural Area  0.382 0.386 
  (0.005) (0.010) 
Expenditure per Adult Equivalent (Dollars per month)  56.136  59.562 
  (2.677) (5.028) 
Access to Electricity  0.779***  0.873*** 
  (0.004) (0.007) 
Access to Running Water  0.481***  0.568*** 
  (0.005) (0.010) 
In-House Sanitary Service  0.317***  0.381*** 
  (0.005) (0.010) 
Telephone Service  0.145***  0.194*** 
  (0.004) (0.008) 
Number of Rooms per Adult Equivalent
  0.648*** 0.792*** 
  (0.006) (0.014) 
Refrigerator 0.387***  0.570*** 
  (0.005) (0.010) 
Family Member Abroad  0.046***  0.719*** 
  (0.002) (0.009) 
Notes: * Significant Difference at 10% level. ** Significant Difference at 5% level. *** Significant Difference at 1% level. 
           
1 Adult Equivalence: Children 0-9 years old are counted as 0.5 of an adult.   51
Table 3: Migration, Remittances, Assets and Education – El Salvador, 1998 
   
Panel A: Asset Index Deciles   












1 4.008  0.078  0.088  0.384 
2 4.242  0.096  0.119  0.377 
3 5.466  0.125  0.147  0.370 
4 6.482  0.119  0.145  0.392 
5 7.583  0.172  0.183  0.308 
6 8.148  0.198  0.229  0.338 
7 9.110  0.218  0.239  0.331 
8 10.177  0.223  0.236 0.279 
9 11.351  0.259  0.264 0.273 
10 13.064  0.242 0.233  0.232 
Total 7.960 0.173  0.188  0.316 
 
Panel B: Remittances and Education 
       











0 0.163  0.176  0.489   
1-4 0.153  0.167 0.436   
5-7 0.160  0.182 0.346   
8-11 0.169  0.196 0.326   
12-14 0.210 0.214  0.214   
14+ 0.184  0.181 0.127   
 
Note: 
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Table 4 - El Salvador: Determinants of Remittance receipts and Migration - Household Level - 1998 
            
Variables Receive  Remittances  International  Migrant 
Family Member 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Age (HH Head)  -0.003***  -0.004***  -0.004***  0.000 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) 
Age Squared x 100 (HH head)  0.006***  0.007***  0.009***  0.003*** 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) 
Female (HH head)  0.156***  0.152***  0.141***  0.141*** 
   (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)  (0.010) 
Married (HH head)  0.038***  0.020***  0.018**  0.019*** 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)  (0.007) 
Max. HH Education  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) 
Number of Children 0-5 Years Old  -0.005  -0.003  -0.003  -0.006 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.004) 
Number of Boys 6-17 Years Old  0.011***  0.014***  0.014***  0.012*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.004) 
Number of Girls 6-17 Years Old  0.017***  0.019***  0.018***  0.019** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.008) 
Rural Area  0.027***  0.066***  0.067***  0.062*** 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)  (0.010) 
Log of Per Capita Expenditure (In colones)  0.038***          
   (0.004)          
Household Asset Index      0.039*** 0.035***  0.035*** 
     (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Village Networks (% of HH with Migrants)       0.722***  0.744*** 
       (0.057)  (0.053) 
Number of Return Int. Migrants (2 + years ago)       0.022**  0.025** 
       (0.011)  (0.010) 
           
Province (Department) Indicators  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Pseudo R2  0.091  0.111  0.125  0.142 
Observations  11,953 11,953 11,953  11,953 
Notes: * Significant at 10% level. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level. Marginal Effects Reported.     53
Table 5: El Salvador - Determinants of Children’s school Attendance (Children between 11 and 17 years old) – 1998 
           
Method Probit  Prop. Score 
Matching  Probit IV  Probit 
Sample Households  All  All  Migrant 
HH  All 
Model  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
HH Receive Remittances  0.071*** 0.046***  0.018  0.011 0.018  0.009 0.035 
   (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)  (0.018)  (0.024)  (0.079) 
                  
Age    -0.085*** -0.084*** -0.085***      -0.071***  -0.084*** 
    (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)      (0.005)  (0.003) 
Female    -0.008 -0.009 -0.010      -0.022  -0.009 
    (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)      (0.020)  (0.011) 
Oldest Child    0.034*** 0.032*** 0.033***      -0.004  0.032*** 
    (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)      (0.023)  (0.012) 
Number of Children 0-5 Years Old    -0.030*** -0.027*** -0.026***      -0.021**  -0.027*** 
    (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)      (0.009)  (0.005) 
Number of Boys 6-17 Years Old    0.014*** 0.018*** 0.017***      0.005  0.018*** 
    (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)      (0.009)  (0.005) 
Number of Girls 6-17 Years Old    0.009* 0.014***  0.013***      0.024***  0.013*** 
    (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)      (0.008)  (0.005) 
Number of Males 18-65 Years Old    -0.034*** -0.030*** -0.030***    -0.015  -0.030*** 
    (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)    (0.010) (0.005) 
Number of Females 18-65 Years Old    0.009 0.011* 0.008      0.007  0.011* 
    (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)      (0.011)  (0.006) 
Female  (HH  head)    -0.020 -0.016 -0.015      0.025  -0.021 
     (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)      (0.020)  (0.020) 
Age (HH head)    0.012***  0.010***  0.010***     0.002   0.010*** 
     (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)      (0.003)  (0.002) 
Age Squared x 100 (HH head)    -0.012***  -0.010*** -0.009***      -0.002  -0.010*** 
     -(0.002) -(0.002) -(0.002)      (0.003)  (0.002) 
Max.  HH  Education    0.049*** 0.040*** 0.039***      0.030***  0.040*** 
     (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)      (0.003)  (0.002) 
Married (HH head)    0.017*  0.009   0.008      0.021   0.008  
     (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)      (0.018)  (0.010) 
Rural Areas    -0.047***  -0.006   -0.010      0.011  -0.008  
    (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)      (0.021)  (0.013) 
                    
Household Asset Index 
+     0.037***      0.026*** 0.036*** 
     (0.003)      (0.006)  (0.005) 
            
Household Assets Indicators 
+   No  No  No  Yes     No  No 
            
State  Indicators  No Yes Yes Yes      Yes  Yes 
Observations  9,194 9,194 9,194 9,194  9,194  1,715  9,194 
Mean of Dependent Variable  0.738 0.738 0.738 0.738  0.738  0.795  0.738 
R-Squared  0.004 0.253 0.266 0.273  -  0.254  - 
Sargan's Test for Over-identification (p-value)  -  -  -  -  -  -  0.930 
Notes: * Significant at 10% level. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level. Robust to Heteroskedasticity Standard Errors reported. Column (5) performs a  
Propensity Score Matching estimation, using all variables in Column (3). Column (7) implements Amemiya’s Generalized Least Squared method, using as instruments village  
migrant networks and the number of return international migrants (2+ years ago). Household Assets included: number of rooms per adult equivalent, home ownership, and  
cement floor; water, electrical, sanitary and telephone services; refrigerator, automobile, TV, VCR, sewing and washing machine. Table 6: El Salvador - Determinants of Child Wage labor (Children between 11 and 17 years old) – 1998 
          
Method Probit  Prop. Score 
Matching  Probit IV  Probit 
Sample Households  All  All  Migrant 
HH  All 
Model (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
HH Receive Remittances  -0.028***  -0.013** -0.012**  -0.013  -0.032*** -0.067*** 
   (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.012)  (0.014)  (0.017) 
               
Age    0.024*** 0.025***      0.020*** 0.025*** 
   (0.001)  (0.001)      (0.003)  (0.001) 
Female    -0.049***  -0.048***    -0.030***  -0.047*** 
   (0.005)  (0.005)      (0.009)  (0.006) 
Oldest Child    0.009 0.009      -0.009 0.008 
   (0.005)  (0.005)      (0.010)  (0.006) 
Number of Children 0-5 Years Old    0.002 0.001      0.003 0.001 
   (0.002)  (0.002)      (0.004)  (0.002) 
Number of Boys 6-17 Years Old    0.001 0.000      0.006* 0.003 
   (0.002)  (0.002)      (0.003)  (0.002) 
Number of Girls 6-17 Years Old    0.002  0.002     0.000  0.004* 
   (0.002)  (0.002)      (0.003)  (0.002) 
Number of Males 18-65 Years Old    -0.005**  -0.006**     -0.009**  -0.006** 
   (0.003)  (0.003)      (0.004)  (0.003) 
Number of Females 18-65 Years Old    -0.004  -0.004     -0.003  -0.004 
   (0.003)  (0.003)      (0.004)  (0.003) 
Female (HH head)    0.022***  0.021***     -0.009  0.043*** 
    (0.006)  (0.006)      (0.008)  (0.012) 
Age (HH head)    -0.001*  -0.001     0.001  -0.002** 
    (0.001)  (0.001)      (0.001)  (0.001) 
Age Squared x 100 (HH head)    0.001  0.001    -0.001  0.002** 
     (0.001) (0.001)    (0.001) (0.001) 
Max. HH Education    -0.005***  -0.005***    -0.003**  -0.005*** 
     (0.001) (0.005)    (0.001) (0.001) 
Married (HH head)    -0.009**   -0.008*      -0.005  -0.007  
    (0.004)  (0.004)      (0.007)  (0.005) 
Rural Areas    -0.016***  -0.013**     -0.026***  -0.010* 
   (0.005)  (0.005)      (0.008)  (0.006) 
                  
Household Assets Index 
+    -0.010***       -0.008*** -0.006** 
   (0.002)       (0.002)  (0.002) 
           
Household Assets Indicators 
+ No  No  Yes      No  No 
           
Province (Department) Indicators  No  Yes  Yes     Yes  Yes 
Observations  9,194 9,194 9,194  9,194  1,715 9,194 
Mean of Dependent Variable  0.083 0.083 0.083  0.083  0.067 0.083 
R-Squared 0.003  0.184  0.191  -  0.223  - 
Sargan's Test for Over-identification (p-value)  -  -  -  -  -  0.121 
Notes: * Significant at 10% level. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level. Robust to Heteroskedasticity Standard Errors reported. Column (5) performs  
a Propensity Score Matching estimation, using all variables in Column (2). Column (6) implements Amemiya’s Generalized Least Squared method, using as  
Instruments village migrant networks and the number of return international migrants (2+ years ago). Household Assets included: number of rooms per adult  
equivalent, home ownership and cement floor; water, electrical, sanitary and telephone services; refrigerator, automobile, TV, VCR, sewing and washing machine. Table 7: El Salvador - Determinants of Male Labor Supply (Adults, 22- 65 years old) – 1998 
          
Method Probit  Prop. Score 
Matching  Probit IV  Probit 
Sample Households  All  All  Migrant HH  All 
Model (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
HH Receive Remittances  -0.066***  -0.020*** -0.013  -0.004  0.022 
   (0.010) (0.008)  (0.016)  (0.022) (0.056) 
              
Household Head    0.136***    0.152***  0.144*** 
   (0.011)    (0.031)  (0.018) 
Age    0.008***     0.012**  0.009*** 
   (0.001)    (0.005)  (0.002) 
Age Squared / 100    -0.014***    -0.020***  -0.015*** 
   (0.002)    (0.006)  (0.002) 
Education (Years)    0.003***    0.010***  0.003*** 
   (0.001)    (0.003)  (0.001) 
Married    0.027***    0.047***  0.027*** 
   (0.006)    (0.022)  (0.006) 
Max. HH Education    -0.002**     -0.006* -0.002** 
    (0.001)    (0.003)  (0.001) 
Number of Children 0-5 Years Old    0.007**     0.022** 0.007*** 
   (0.003)    (0.011) (0.003) 
Number of Boys 6-17 Years Old    0.010***     0.018* 0.010*** 
   (0.003)    (0.011)  (0.003) 
Number of Girls 6-17 Years Old    0.004    -0.009 0.010*** 
   (0.003)  (0.010)  (0.003) 
Number of Males 18-65 Years Old    -0.005     -0.009 0.003 
   (0.003)    (0.010)  (0.003) 
Number of Females 18-65 Years Old    0.001    0.015 0.004 
    (0.003)  (0.011)  (0.003) 
Rural Area    0.009     0.003 -0.004 
   (0.007)    (0.024)  (0.003) 
Household Assets Index    -0.005***    -0.012** -0.007** 
    (0.002)  (0.006)  (0.003) 
            
Province (Department) Indicators  No  Yes     Yes  Yes 
Observations  10,641 10,641  10,641  1,478  10,641 
Mean of Dependent Variable  0.901 0.901  0.901  0.829 0.901 
R-Squared 0.009  0.121  -  0.093  - 
Sargan's Test for Overidentification (p-value)  - -  -  -  0.382 
Notes: * Significant at 10% level. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level. Standard Errors clustered at the household level. Column (3) performs a   
Propensity Score Matching estimation, using all variables in Column (2). Column (5) implements Amemiya’s Generalized Least Squared method, using as instruments  
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Table 8: El Salvador - Determinants of Female Labor Supply (Adults, 22- 65 years old) -1998 





Probit IV  Probit 
Sample Households  All  All  Migrant 
HH  All 
Model (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
HH Receive Remittances  -0.067***  -0.086*** -0.081***  -0.067** -0.592*** 
   (0.011) (0.012) (0.018)  (0.026)  (0.050) 
              
Household Head    0.175***     0.020  0.241*** 
   (0.013)     (0.027)  (0.018) 
Age    0.036***     0.042***  0.021*** 
   (0.003)     (0.007)  (0.004) 
Age Squared / 100    -0.050***     -0.051***  -0.031*** 
   (0.004)     (0.008)  (0.005) 
Education (Years)    0.016***     0.021***  0.014*** 
   (0.002)     (0.003)  (0.002) 
Married    -0.064***     -0.060**  -0.060*** 
   (0.010)     (0.024)  (0.011) 
Own Baby (0-2 Years Old)    -0.104***     -0.063 -0.121*** 
   (0.014)     (0.039)  (0.016) 
Pregnant    -0.120***     -0.089  -0.161*** 
   (0.025)     (0.084)  (0.028) 
Max. HH Education    -0.001     0.003 0.001 
    (0.002)     (0.004)  (0.002) 
Number of Children 0-5 Years Old    0.007     -0.001 -0.008 
   (0.005)    (0.013) (0.006) 
Number of Boys 6-17 Years Old    0.006     0.015 0.017*** 
   (0.005)     (0.012)  (0.006) 
Number of Girls 6-17 Years Old    0.010*    -0.009 0.027*** 
   (0.005)   (0.012)  (0.006) 
Number of Males 18-65 Years Old    -0.033***     -0.025* -0.052*** 
   (0.006)     (0.013)  (0.007) 
Number of Females 18-65 Years Old    0.025***    0.007 0.049*** 
   (0.006)   (0.013)  (0.007) 
Rural Area    -0.136***     -0.156*** -0.090*** 
   (0.012)     (0.028)  (0.016) 
Household Assets Index    0.012***    -0.001    0.041*** 
   (0.003)   (0.007)  (0.006) 
              
Province (Department) Indicators  No  Yes     Yes  Yes 
Observations  12,939 12,939 12,939  2,316  12,939 
Mean of Dependent Variable  0.506 0.506 0.506  0.462  0.506 
Pseudo R-Squared  0.002  0.115  -  0.111  - 
Sargan's Test for Overidentification (p-value)  - - -  -  0.295 
Notes: * Significant at 10% level. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level. Standard Errors clustered at the household level. Column (3) performs a   
Propensity Score Matching estimation, using all variables in Column (2). Column (5) implements Amemiya’s Generalized Least Squared method, using as  
instruments village migrant networks and the number of return international migrants (2+ years ago).   






Table 9: El Salvador - Impact of Remittances on Selected Cases - IV Probit 






1 Wage  labor
2 Labor  Supply 
HH Receive Remittances  -0.062  -0.063**       
   (0.108) (0.020)      
HH Receive Remittances*Female  0.147**  -0.021       
   (0.052) (0.034)      
HH Receive Remittances  -0.039  -0.068**       
   (0.101) (0.019)      
HH Receive Remittances * Age 11-14  0.112**  0.003       
   (0.043) (0.033)      
HH Receive Remittances        -0.115  -0.361** 
         (0.117) (0.126) 
HH Receive Remittances * Age 22-25        0.063  -0.369*** 
     (0.022) (0.091) 
HH Receive Remittances * Age 26-49        0.084**  -0.435*** 
     (0.014) (0.088) 
HH Receive Remittances * Age 50-59        0.064**  -0.180* 
         (0.015) (0.094) 
Notes: * Significant at 10% level. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level. 
                  1 Other controls are detailed in Table 5. Base categories are constituted by males and children aged 15-17 years old respectively. 
           
2 Other controls are detailed in Table 6. Base categories are constituted by males and children aged 15-17 years old respectively. 
           
3 Other controls are detailed in Table 7. Base category is constituted by males aged 60-65 years old.   
           
4 Other controls are detailed in Table 8. Base category is constituted by females aged 60-65 years old.   
 